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RATE DISCRIMINATIONS BETWEEN PORTS-THE GULF
PORTS DIFFERENTIAL CASE
THE Supreme Court's decision at the end of last term in Texas and Pacific
Railway Company v. United States' may be said to have set the Interstate
Commerce Commission back in its long struggle to eliminate railroad discrim-
inations virtually to the time of the Commission's decision in 1911 in Ashland
Fire Brick Company v. Southern Railway Company.2 The rule of the Ash-
land case was an inevitable product of the circumstances and ideas of the pre-
war era. The statutory prohibition against giving "any undue or unreason-
able preference or advantage to any particular person . .. or locality, or any
particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever," or to subject them
to any undue prejudice,3 was readily enforceable where only one carrier was
involved in the discriminatory rate relationship; an order to cease the discrim-
ination was sufficient, leaving the method of doing so to the carrier's discre-
1. 289 U. S. 627, decided May 29, 1933.
2. 22 I. C. C. 115 (1911).
3. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1) (1926).
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tion.4 But where two or more carriers were involved, as was usually the case in
important rate controversies between sectional interests, the problem was more
complicated. An attempt by any one carrier to comply with an order to end
the discrimination by lowering its own prejudicial rate could be nullified by
further reductions on the part of carriers participating only in the preferential
rate. Without the minimum rate power the Commission was obviously unable
to control such competitive reductions.5 Moreover, before the wartime ex-
perience with unified control of the railroads, it was fundamental that the Com-
mission must deal with each carrier separately and establish the responsibility
of each individually.6 As early as 1892, therefore, the Commissions declared that
"undue" discrimination may not be said to exist as between localities unless
the same carrier serves them or participates in their traffic.7 It was not until
the Ashland case, however, that the doctrine was fully developed that a dis-
crimination was not "undue" unless the defendant carrier not only participated
in both the preference and the prejudice but was also a responsible participant,
in the sense of being able itself to put an end to the discrimination.8
The large area of discrimination thus exempted from the Commission's
4. In earlier days it was thought necessary that an alternative must be allowed the
carrier in complying, Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 74 Fed. 803 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896), aff'd, 167 U. S. 633 (1897), and this was
still deemed proper in American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617 (1917). With the
enlarged powers granted the Commission in Section 15 of the Act of 1920, the Court has as-
sumed, United States v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 266 U. S. 191 (1924), and the Commission
has expressly said, that no alternative need be given carriers in remedying discrimination in
rates, Arkansas Jobbers & Manufacturers Association v. Director General, 59 I. C. C. 662,
669 (1920), or in practices, York Manufacturers Association v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 107
I. C. C. 219, 231-2 (1926).
5. "The only way to establish differentials where entirely independent carriers serve a
common market from competing producing points would be to fix maximum ... and mini-
mum rates ... and the latter is not within our authority." Galloway Coal Co. v. Alabama
Great Southern Rr. Co., 40 I. C. C. 311, 315 (1916).
6. An order of the Commission directed against a number of carriers on a finding of
discrimination "must be supported by evidence which is sufficient to warrant a finding
separately against each railroad named in the order." St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern
Ry. Co. v. United States, 217 Fed. 80, 82 (E. D. Ill. 1914); cf. Galloway Coal Co. v. Ala-
bama Great Southern Rr. Co., supra note 5; Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. v. Tioga South-
eastern Ry. Co., 16 I. C. C. 323, 332 (1909).
7. Eau Claire Board of Trade v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 5 I. C. C. 264
(1892).
8. In the Ashland case, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, participating
in traffic from two competing localities to a common market, was allowed to continue a dis.
crimination between the two because there were other "free" lines from each locality not
participating at all in traffic from the other, and hence not subject to control; so that the
prejudiced locality would be no better off if the Louisville and Nashville should withdraw
from the traffic entirely. Commissioner Lane, speaking for the Commission, said (22 I. C. C.
at 120): "The test of the discrimination is the ability of one of the carriers participating in
the two through routes from the two points of origin to the same point of destination
to put an end to the discrimination by its own act." The many cases in which this doc-
trine has been relied upon are cited in 2 INTERSTATE CO-a=RcE AcTs ANN. (1930) 1164, and
in Commissioner Porter's dissent in Duluth Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago & North-
western Ry. Co., 156 I. C. C. 156, 173 (1929).
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control could not but prove a subject of controversy. In 1917 the Supreme
Court seemingly approved a relaxation of the rule in holding that a carrier
participating in traffic to the preferred point and billing through traffic to the
prejudiced point thereby became an "effective instrument of discrimination."i'
And when the Transportation Act of 1920 not only recognized the need for
treating carriers as parts of a unified transportation system,10 but also gave the
Commission power to establish minimum rates,"L the Ashland rule might well
have been discarded as outgrown. For if the competition of free lines at the
preferred point was not within the control of the prejudicing carrier it would
surely be within the Commission's control. Henceforth the Commission could
abate discriminations created by a group of carriers whether or not they all
joined in traffic to both points by fixing maximum, minimum or intermediate
exact rates.' 2 But established principles, like vested interests, do not readily
yield to new conditions. Fortified by the Supreme Court's decision and by its
increased powers, the Commission in 1921 took a step away from the Ashland
rule, only to be brought up sharply by the Court, which in enjoining the Com-
mission's order declared that carriers can be held responsible only if each
carrier has participated in some way in that which causes the discrimination.
"What Congress sought to prevent . . . was not differences between localities in
transportation rates... but unjust discrimination between them by the same
carrier or carriers.' 3 With this rebuke freshly in mind, the Commission de-
clined to act in several cases because some of the carriers did not participate in
both of the rates creating the discrimination.14 Thus matters stood until 1924,
9. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. United States, 245 U. S. 136, 144 (1917). This
was one of the first of a line of cases in which Mr. Justice Brandeis has until now expounded
Section 3 for a unanimous Court.
10. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 (1924) (the recapture
clause); New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184 (1923) (favoring weak roads in
apportioning divisions of joint rates) ; cf. the loan fund established by the Fifteen Per Cent
Rate Case, 1931, 178 I. C. C. 539 (1931), modified to make the pool voluntary, 179 I. C. C.
215 (1931); Securities and Acquisition of Control of Railway Express Agency, Inc., 150
I. C. C. 423 (1929). And see Comment (1933) 42 YALz L. J. 747.
The effect of the wartime unification of the carriers on the interpretation of Section 3
may be seen in Equity Cooperative Packing Co. v. Director General, 64 I. C. C. 615 (1921),
where, in determining a carrier's responsibility for a discriminatory rate relationship, the
requirement of participation was not applied as to the period of federal control, but was
applied as to the subsequent period.
11. 41 STAT. 4S4 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15 (1) (1926).
12. The minimum rate power was apparently granted, in as broad terms as the power
to fix maximum rates, without recognition of its possible effects on Section 3. See speeches
by Representative Esch, 58 CoNG. REc. 8317 (1919), and by Senator Cummins, 59 CoNG;.
REc. 141 (1919); H. R. REP. 456, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919) 19.
13. Central Rr. Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 257 U. S. 247, 259 (1921), setting
aside the Commission's order in American Creosoting Co. v. Director General, 61 I. C. C. 145
(1921).
14. Sugar Cases of 1922, 81 I. C. C. 448 (1923); Maritime Association of Boston Cham-
ber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor Rr. Co., 95 I. C. C. 539 (1925), 126 I. C. C. 199 (1927).
In the Salt Cases of 1923, 92 I. C. C. 388 (1924), aff'd, Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co.
v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 315 (N. D. Ohio 1925) (no appeal taken), minimum rates and
differentials were prescribed, but an imminent rate war served as a justification in addition
to the existence of discrimination.
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when the Court in United States v. Illinois Central Railroad Company 11 again
used language that seemed to indicate a greatly broadened view of the Com-
mission's power over discriminations. Three subsequent decisions of the Court
adopted a similar attitude in holding carriers liable for discriminatory switch-
ing practices.' 6 The Commission too gave definite signs of wavering in its
adherence to the Ashland rule.' 7 In all these instances, however, explana-
tions of the decisions may perhaps be found in the economic inequality of the
parties; the issue was not raised where large stakes were involved, with power-
ful carriers ranged on opposing sides. Two such important cases were be-
fore the Commission in 1927. The Lake Cargo Coal Rate controversy' 8 came
15. 263 U. S. 515 (1924), sustaining Swift Lumber Co. v. Fernwood & Gulf Rr. Co.,
61 I. C. C. 485 (1921). The case is readily distinguishable on its facts from the Central
of New Jersey case, and it is the doctrines announced in the latter, not its results, that are
hard to reconcile with the St. Louis Southwestern case, supra note 9. What seemed most
significant in the Illinois Central decision was this: "In view of the policy and provisions
of ... [the Transportation Act, 1920), the Commission may properly have concluded that
the carrier's desire to originate traffic on its own lines, or to take traffic from a competitor,
should not be given as much weight in determining the justness of a discrimination against
a locality as theretofore. For now, the interests of the individual carrier must yield in
many respects to the public need ... and the newly conferred power to grant relief against
rates unreasonably low may afford protection against injurious rate policies of a competitor,
which were theretofore uncontrollable.' Supra at 525.
16. United States v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 266 U. S. 191 (1924); Chicago, Indianapolis
& Louisville Ry. Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 287 (1926); Virginian Ry. Co. v. United
States, 272 U. S. 658 (1926). In the latter case rates as well as switching practices were
involved, but Section 1 was invoked as well as Section 3. Cf. Chemical Lime Co. v. Belle-
fonte Central Rr. Co., 147 I. C. C. 285 (1928).
17. Oswego V. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 146 I. C. C. 293 (1928), 151 I. C. C. 717 (1929),
seems to have been the first case in which the Commission declined, by a bare majority vote,
to excuse carriers from prejudice on account of competition at the preferred point which
they could not control. Duluth Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.,
156 I. C. C. 156 (1929), and Inland Empire Manufacturers' Association v. Abilene & South-
ern Ry. Co., 165 I. C. C. 53 (1930), followed it without mention of the Ashland case except
by dissenters. On the other hand, in Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Illinois Terminal Co.,
161 I. C. C. 176, 179 (1930), the Ashland case was cited and applied strictly-reaching
a desirable result on the facts. And see Commissioner Eastman's discussion in Eastern Class
Rate Investigation, 164 I. C. C. 314, 416 (1930), and his dissent in Baltimore Chamber of
Commerce v. Ann Arbor Rr. Co., 159 I. C. C. 691, 709 (1929).
18. Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 I. C. C. 309 (1927), rev'g same case, 101 I. C. C.
513 (1925), which had dismissed the complaint under Section 3 on the ground of the
Ashland rule. But cf. Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 46 I. C. C. 159 (1917), where the exercise
of the power had gone unchallenged. The controversy dealt with rates from northern
soft coal fields, served by one set of carriers, on coal to Lake Erie ports for transshipment,
and with rates from the southern coal fields, served by another group of carriers, who,
however, reached the lake ports for the most part only by connections with the northern
carriers. The rates from the northern fields were alleged to be unduly prejudicial as com-
pared with those from the southern fields. The issue under Section 3 was whether the
southern roads could be held responsible. The Commission's suspension of competitive re-
ductions from the southern fields, Lake Cargo Coal from Kentucky, 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928),
precipitated the appeal to the courts. See MANSIELD, THE LA=. CARGO COAr. RATE Cox-
TROVERSY (1932).
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to a head first, but a railroad compromise while the case was on the Supreme
Court's docket allowed the Court to dismiss that case as moot.19 The other
was Texas and Pacific Railway Company v. United States.
2 0
This case involved rates to Galveston and other Texas ports on the one
hand, and on the other to the port of New Orleans, on export, import and
coastwise traffic from and to central and northern Texas, Oklahoma, southern
Kansas, Arkansas, and western Louisiana.21 Although the Texas ports were
considerably closer to the producing area, the carriers serving New Orleans
maintained equal or lower rates to that port. In general, rates from and to
points as much as 150 miles farther from New Orleans than from the Texas
ports were nevertheless lower to New Orleans; and where New Orleans was
from 150 to 200 miles more distant, the rates were equalized. Not until the
route to New Orleans was 200 miles or more longer than that to the Texas -ports
did the latter enjoy a differential advantage in rates.22 An important carrier
to New Orleans in this traffic was the Texas and Pacific Railway, stock control
of which had recently been obtained by the Missouri Pacific Railroad.
23
Traffic between the producing area in question and the Texas ports passed over
the lines, among others, of the International-Great Northern, another Missouri
Pacific subsidiary. In 1921 commercial interests of Galveston complained to
the Commission, alleging that the failure of the rate structure to reflect the
Texas ports' natural advantages in distance was unduly prejudicial to them and
preferential to New Orleans. Evidence was laid before the Commission in
1922 and 1923; argument followed in 1924, and finally, in 1925, Division 2
of the Commission announced a decision. Holding that "a line must be found
beyond which distance may not be disregarded," the Commissioners ordered
19. United States v. Anchor Coal Co., (Mem.) 279 U. S. 812 (1929), rev'g Anchor
Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462 (D. W. Va. 1928). A renewed complaint of the
northern operators under Section 3 alone was dismissed for want of factual merit, Lake
Cargo Coal Cases, 1930, 181 I. C. C. 37 (1932), over Commissioner Eastman's strong dissent.
20. Supra note 1.
21. Cotton, grain and petroleum, and their products, were the principal commodities
involved. The rates to Houston, Texas City, Beaumont, Port Arthur and Orange, the
other Texas ports, were equalized on this traffic with those to Galveston, and the Commission
did not disturb this relationship. A large area in southern and southeastern territory east
of the Mississippi river shipped only through New Orleans. A much smaller area in
southern and western Texas, south of the Texas and Pacific, shipped only through the Texas
ports. The area in dispute was the large sector between these two. Most of the intervenors
from the origin territory shipped to New Orleans and sided with her in the case, preferring
equalization because it favored established trade channels. But some smaller towns nearer Gal-
veston, hoping by means of a lower Texas rate to divert business from the main distributing
centers such as St. Louis and Kansas City, sided with the Texas ports.
22. See table of average distances and average rates on various commodities to the two
ports in Galveston Commercial Association v. Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio
Ry. Co., 100 I. C. C. 110, 125 (1925).
23. Texas & Pacific Readjustment, 86 I. C. C. 808 (1924). The Texas and Pacific runs
eastward from El Paso, Texas, across the middle of the state to Shreveport, La., thence
southeastward to New Orleans. At Dallas, Fort Worth and other points its lines are in-
tersected by north-and-south carriers serving the Texas ports. The Southern Pacific is
the only railroad beside members of the Missouri Pacific system which serves both New
Orleans and the Texas ports.
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equalization of rates where the differences in distance were less than 100 miles,
and prescribed differentials of from 3 to 13 cents per hundred pounds on a
variety of commodities where the differences in distance exceeded 100 miles.
2 4
In this decision it was assumed that the Texas and Pacific could be held re-
sponsible along with the other carriers under the rule of the Ashland case, al-
though it did not itself reach Galveston, because it could be regarded as part
of the Missouri Pacific system, which served the Texas ports through other sub-
sidiaries.
25
Two years later the full Commission, with two members dissenting, af-
firmed the Division's finding of discrimination, but prescribed differentials
wherever the difference in the distances exceeded 25%, instead of the previous
flat limit of 100 miles.26 But over the protest of four of the Commissioners who
approved the finding of discrimination, a majority of six voted to exempt
the Texas and Pacific from compliance with the order, on the ground that
the Missouri Pacific had not been shown to have exercised any influence
over the Texas and Pacific, despite its stock control.2 7 The latter was hence
entitled to be treated as an independent line, and, under the familiar Ashland
rule, to be exempted from liability for the discrimination.28  Thus though
the circumstances that had made the Ashland decision necessary had long since
become matters of history, that decision was made the instrument by which
relief from an admitted discrimination was rendered ineffective. But the Com-
mission's arrangement proved unworkable. The Texas and Pacific took full
advantage of its exemption, and the other carriers found that adherence to the
order without the Texas and Pacific, where feasible at all, would undermine
most of the rate structure in the Southwest. The other Texas carriers, led by
the Santa Fe, therefore petitioned the Commission to reconsider its exemption
of the Texas and Pacific. Thereupon, in a third report filed late in 1929, the
24. Galveston Commercial Association v. Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Ry. Co.,
supra note 22. The report was written by Commissioner Campbell, who had in earlier
days been counsel for the Spokane shippers in the Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S.
476 (1914), and so might be expected to retain a lingering fondness for the distance prin-
ciple in rate-fixing. Differentials recognizing differences in distance of 100 miles and more
from Galveston and from New Orleans to the same general territory had been prescribed
in Coffee from Galveston and other Gulf Ports, 64 I. C. C. 26 (1921), and for differences
of 25 miles or more on cotton compressed in transit, in Galveston Commercial Association
v. Alabama and Vicksburg Ry. Co., 77 I. C. C. 388 (1923). Both of these were domestic
rates, on which extensive grouping is less easily justified than on import and export rates.
But see California Growers' and Shippers' Protective League v. Southern Pacific Co., 129
I. C. C. 25, 34 (1927).
25. Texas & Pacific Readjustment, supra note 23; Control of International-Great
Northern Rr., 90 I. C. C. 262 (1924); Control of Gulf Coast Lines by Missouri Pacific Rr.,
94 I. C. C. 191 (1924).
26. 128 1. C. C. 349 (1927). Petroleum was exempted from the finding, apparently be-
cause of the established investment in the industry, at the expense of logical consistency.
In a later decision the Commission refused to order a differential on molasses. Blackstrap
Molasses from Louisiana Points, 171 I. C. C. 583, 591 (1931).
27. Supra note 26, at 381.
28. Ancient Supreme Court doctrine was cited for this. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 115 U. S. 587 (1885). But see Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul
Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic and Commerce Association, 247 U. S. 490, 500 (1918).
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Commission summoned all its courage and definitely repudiated the Ashland
rule as too narrow a construction of its present powers under Section 3 (1) .9
It ordered the Texas and Pacific to join the other carriers in ending the dis-
crimination against Galveston. The question of the railroad's responsibility
as a member of the Missouri Pacific system, however, was purposely left open.
After eight years before the Commission, the case was now taken to court
by the Texas and Pacific. A three-judge district court refused to enjoin en-
forcement of the Commission's order,20 and the railroad appealed. Argument
was heard by the Supreme Court early in October, 1931, but months went by
without any decision. Finally in June, 1932, the Court restored the case to
the docket for reargument upon all questions, and puzzled counsel by inviting
their attention especially to the question "whether the respective relations of
the Louisiana ports and the Texas ports to the export, import, and coastwise
traffic affected, . . . are such that the Louisiana ports may be regarded as
localities unduly or unreasonably preferred . . and that the Texas ports may
be regarded as localities unduly or unreasonably prejudiced" within the mean-
ing of Section 3(1).3' The significance of this ambiguously worded question
was lost upon most of the counsel, who, in the reargument in October, 1932, ac-
corded the point scant attention. Once again a full term was taken for con-
sideration. On May 29, 1933, with Mr. Justice Stone, the Chief Justice, Mr.
Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Cardozo dissenting, Mr. Justice Roberts read
a decision -3 2 that echoes the attitudes of a bygone generation. The Court dis-
tinguished away its previous relaxations of the strict Ashland rule, and put many
discriminations definitely beyond the Commission's control by declaring that
that rule must still be enforced. But the Court was not satisfied with thus
limiting the scope of the Commission's authority. Carrying out the hint con-
tained in its order calling for reargument, the Court also held that a port is
not a "locality" as to traffic passing through it, and that therefore when Con-
gress declared any undue preference given "to any . . . locality . . . in any
respect whatsoever" to be unlawful, 33 it did not mean to include preferences
given to ports. It followed that Section 3(1) gave the Commission no power
to alter the rate relationship between New Orleans and the Texas ports.34
The decision of the Court that the Texas and Pacific could not be included
in the Commission's order was wholly unnecessary. Even if the Ashland rule
is still to be applied, that company, as Mr. Justice Stone points out in his dissent,
29. 160. I. C. C. 345, 358 (1929).
30. Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 281 (D. Tex. 1930).
Foster, Circuit Judge, dissenting at 286, could not conceive how equal rates could be dis-
criminatory. See Notes (1931) 6'Wis. L. REv. 241; (1930) 9 Tzx. L. Rav. 74.
31. Supra note 1, at 634, n. 10.
32. Supra note 1. Mr. Justice Stone read a dissenting opinion in which the rest of the
minority concurred.
33. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 3(1) (1926).
34. "It seems too plain for argument that the Commission has no authority, upon a
showing by a gateway that under an existing tariff too much traffic passes through an-
other, or too little through it, to readjust the rates and prescribe differentials so as to divert
traffic through the complaining gateway." Supra note 1, at 639.
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could eliminate the discrimination. 35 If it did not choose to raise its rate to
New Orleans in order to accomplish this end, the Texas and Pacific could in-
stead reduce its portion of its joint rate to the Texas ports and then procure
from the Commission an order 36 for an equitable division of the lowered joint
rate. But, as the Commission concluded in its third report, the rule of the
Ashland case now serves only to prevent the remedying of admitted discrim-
inations which are within the control of the Commission, if not of the prejudic-
ing carrier. The Commission, it is true, has been chary of exercising its mini-
mum rate power, and the availability of this power to support Section 3(1)
orders against discriminations has yet to be tested.3 7 But the statute on its
face declares that the Commission may use its minimum rate power whenever
it believes a rate to be ". . . unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or
prejudicial." 3  Mr. Justice Roberts states, as his reason for adherence to the
Ashland rule, that where the preferring carrier and the prejudicing carrier are
independent, "neither the first nor the second carrier alone can be held to have
created the relation. Assuming that neither rate is unreasonable, the one car-
rier cannot be compelled to alter its rate, because the other is higher or lower
for the same service."3 19 Apparently, Mr. Justice Roberts views liability under
Section 3(1) as grounded upon fault, and the Commission's order to be penal
in nature. The recent history of railroad regulation suggests rather that the
function of the Commission in this regard is the remedying of abuses wherever
found and however caused.4 ° Governmental agencies are not restricted to legal
concepts of civil or criminal guilt in their administration of a public policy.
It is more likely, therefore, that the Court's chief reliance was upon the fact
that, as Mr. Justice Roberts said, the Ashland rule is a "principle upon which
the Commission has acted with the approval of this Court for more than forty
years in the administration of section 3."41
But if the Court's reaffirmation of the Ashland rule was unnecessary, there is
even less to be said for its holding that a port is not a "locality," within the
35. Id. at 668. There is now little practical importance in the conflict of dicta in the
majority and minority opinions, at 650 and 668, as to whether an alternative must be allowed
carriers in complying with Section 3(1). See note 4, supra. If the Commission takes care
always to invoke Section 15(1) as well as Section 3 whenever there is any doubt on the point,
there will be no trouble, for it is clear that no alternative need be offered under Section
15(1).
36. Under 41 STAT. 486 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15(6) (1926).
37. The minimum rate power was invoked by the complainants in all of the cases cited
in note 14, supra. Compare the discussion in Commisioner Eastman's dissent in Lake
Cargo Coal from Kentucky, supra note 18, at 400-403; and see Bik1, Power of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to Prescribe Minimum Rates (1922) 36 HAnv. L. Rav. 5.
38. 41 STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15(1) (1926).
39. Supra note 1, at 650.
40. There was a dictum in the Shreveport case, often repeated, that the language of
Section 3(1) "is certainly sweeping enough to embrace all the discrimination of the sort
described which it was within the power of Congress to condemn. . . It is apparent from
the legislative history of the act that the evil of discrimination was the principal thing
aimed at.' Houston, East and West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 356
(1914); cf. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 478 (1911); Merchants
Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 501, 512 (1931); see also the cases cited supra,
notes 9, 10, 15, 16.
41. Supra note 1, at 654. Stare decisis has no place in the decisions of an administrative
tribunal.
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meaning of Section 3(1), as respects traffic passing through it. That a port,
geographically speaking, is a locality, and that its interest in the rates on im-
port, export and coastwise traffic is tremendous, need hardly be argued. The
question is rather whether or not the Commission shall have jurisdiction over
the rate structure on one of the most important items in the total volume of
railroad traffic. It has never occurred to the Commission to doubt that port
relationships are proper subjects for its consideration. 42  Ports favored by the
railroads have, it is true, sometimes urged that a Commission order depriving
them of their advantages would constitute a port preference in violation of
Article 1, section 9, paragraph 6, of the Constitution. 43 But the Commission,
with historical evidence overwhelmingly on its side, has refused to find in the
port preference clause any restriction upon the plenary power of Congress over
interstate railroad rates.44 Indeed, port differential controversies have been
among the most important handled by the Commission. The rate wars that
led to the first establishment of the Atlantic port differentials were a major
factor in the decision of Congress to undertake rate regulation in 1887.
45  Sim-
ilar controversies have been before the Commission frequently since that time,4'
42. See cases cited infra, note 46. On the effect of long-continued administrative inter-
pretation, see New York, New Haven & Hartford Rr. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, 200 U. S. 361, 401 (1906); United States v. Chicago, North Shore & Milwaukee
Rr. Co., 283 U. S. 1 (1933). That interpretation gains added force where, as here, the
statute has been often amended and the provision in question has remained unchanged.
The Court, however, said, supra note 1, at 644, "We are not persuaded these rulings form
a body of administrative action sufficient to overthrow the evident purpose of section 3,"
and dismissed the whole argument with the remark that, "Where a statutory body has
assumed a power plainly not granted, no amount of such interpretation is binding upon
the courts." Id. at 640. No more appropriate citation could have been offered for this
than the one the Court gave, the Maximum Rate Case, Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 510 (1897). The answer
in both cases is that the power was not "plainly" granted or withheld until after the Court
had spoken.
43. "No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the
Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall any Vessel bound to, or from, one State
be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another." See Brief on Reargument for New
Orleans Joint Traffic Association in the instant case; Maritime Association of Boston Cham-
ber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor Rr. Co., supra note 14, at 542.
44. This specific restriction on the power of Congress was originally intended to prevent
discriminatory regulations upon vessels in favor of the ports of one state as against those
of another, and has never been extended to apply to land carriage charges on goods to or
from ports. It has given rise to little litigation. See SFN. Doc. 154, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924).
45. A collection of documents with some explanatory matter on these controversies will
be found in DAisH, TnE Anssrnc PoRT Drva= Lus (1918). A more connected review
of the history is appended to the Commission's report in the Boston case, Maritime Associa-
tion of Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor Rr. Co., supra note 14, at 583.
46. The more important have been New York Produce Exchange v. Baltimore & Ohio
Rr. Co., 7 I. C. C. 612 (1898); In the Matter of Differential Freight Rates, 11 I. C. C. 13
(1905); Chamber of Commerce of New York v. New York Central and Hudson River Rr.
Co., 24 I. C. C. 55 (1912), 27 I. C. C. 238 (1913) ; In the Matter of Import Rates, 24 I. C. C.
78, 678 (1912), 27 I. C. C. 245 (1913) ; Astoria v. Spokane, Portland and Seattle Rr. Co., 38
I. C. C. 16 (1916); Mobile Chamber of Commerce v. Mobile & Ohio Rr. Co., 57 I. C. C.
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and may be expected to recur in the future. The importance of the interests
involved in the principal case sufficiently demonstrates the necessity for leav-
ing port differentials within the jurisdiction of the Commission, unless one
despairs of the usefulness of the entire attempt at Commission regulation of
rates. Why should port rates enjoy a peculiar immunity?
Speculation upon the real grounds for the Court's decision is hardly fruitful.
There is some evidence that Mr. Justice Roberts felt that ending a discrimina-
tion by substituting differentials for equal rates was something essentially dif-
ferent from accomplishing that purpose by substituting equalization for dif-
ferentials, as though equality of rates necessarily meant equality of treatment.
47
It may be that the Court still relies upon competition among railroads as a
satisfactory regulator of the commercial development of the country.48 Perhaps
the justices were influenced by Mr. Justice Roberts's evident feeling that port
interests, except as they are individually producers or consumers, are at best
necessary middlemen in the traffic, parasites on the economic organism, and as
such not entitled to any independent consideration.49 In any event a majority
of the Court is apparently unwilling to follow Mr. Justice Brandeis further in
the liberalization of Section 3, in the process of which he has heretofore enjoyed
the support of a unanimous Court.50
The consequences of this decision may be more confidently estimated. Had
the Court been content with a reaffirmation of the Ashland doctrine, without
deliberately raising the question whether a port is a "locality," the Commission
would still have been free to achieve its original result in this case by holding
that the Texas and Pacific was responsible for the discrimination as a member
of the Missouri Pacific system. As matters now stand, however, not only
554 (1920) ; Coffee from Galveston and other Gulf Ports, 58 I. C. C. 716 (1920), and supra
note 24; Sugar Cases of 1922, supra note 14; Charleston Traffic Bureau v. Alabama Great
Southern Rr. Co., 89 I. C. C. 501 (1924); Maritime Association of Boston Chamber of
Commerce v. Ann Arbor Rr. Co., supra note 14; Oswego v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co.,
Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor Rr. Co., both supra note 17; and the princi-
pal case here discussed.
47. The Court distinguishes as irrelevant cases "where, on shippers' complaint against
differentials, equalization of rates was ordered." Supra note 1, at 643-4.
48. Speaking of the results of railroad competition in the principal case, Mr. Justice
Roberts stated that "With the abstract fairness of such an adjustment neither the Commission
nor the courts have any concern." Supra note 1, at 635-6.
49. "The Act was passed for the protection of those who pay or bear the rates... The
word 'localities,' therefore, has its proper office as denoting the origin or destination of
traffic... The term was, however, not intended to cover a junction, ... a gateway, or a
port, as respects traffic passing through it." Supra note 1, at 638. Presumably the Commis-
sion did weigh the relative claims of shippers and port interests in this case. When Com-
missioner Hall, dissenting from the Commission's second decision, said, supra note 26, at
399, "In deciding this strife between Texas and Louisiana ports ... the producers and ship-
pers who pay those rates seem to have been lost from sight," he was protesting the weight
the majority gave to the Galveston complaint, not denying that it could lawfully be given
any weight. Cf. Mr. Justice Stone's dissent, supra note 1, at 662; United States v. Illinois
Central Rr. Co., supra note 15.
50. All the decisions on Section 3 herein discussed, supra notes 9, 13, 15, 16, were written
by him.
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Galveston, but Baltimore, Boston and other portsP1 must postpone to the
indefinite future any hope of rate readjustments which they have long been
seeking, unless business houses located at these ports can qualify as shippers
and show that they suffer, as compared with shippers similarly located at
other ports, by reason of a discriminatory port rate relationship. 2  On the
other hand, ports such as Seattle, and their carriers, which as the result of a
rate structure imposed by the Commission have been deprived of traffic which
they might otherwise share, are now free to seek that traffic. But the ultimate
importance of the case will of course depend upon whether the decision marks
a new policy toward the Commission's authority, which the Court will adhere
to in the future, or whether it is intended merely to set an extreme limit which
will not often be approached. In either case, the decision is contrary in spirit
to the policy of further railroad coordination recently entrusted to Commissioner
Eastman.
H. C. M.
CORRELATIVE RIGHTS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT TO
SECURITY DEPOSIT
IN order to protect himself against defaults by a financially irresponsible lessee,
a landlord often requires a payment or deposit as security for his tenant's
faithful performance of the terms of the lease.' The sum advanced is usually
in cash or liquid securities in the amount of two to six months' rent. The ma-
jor problems which arise with respect to such security deposits concern the rights
of the landlord upon the tenant's default, and those of the tenant when his bene-
ficial interest in the deposit is threatened by the landlord's conduct or financial
position.
In accordance with the common-law rule that a re-entry by the lessor for
condition broken cuts off his claims for subsequent rent or damages, the courts
hold that upon a premature termination of the lease the landlord must return
the security deposit, less damages accrued at the time of re-entry.2 It is pos-
51. See cases cited note 46, supra.
52. The appellees undertook to support the order in the instant case on the ground that
the port interests were also shippers and consignees, but the Court held there was no finding
of prejudice to them in that capacity, and that "the plain purpose of the orders was to
build up the Texas ports by diverting export and import traffic to them." Supra note 1,
at 646. See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 600.
Of course, port rates are still within the Commission's jurisdiction under Section 1 if
alleged to be unreasonably high or too low to be compensatory. Armour Packing Co. v.
United States, 153 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907). But usually in a situation of this kind the
rates are all within the zone of reasonableness.
1. The deposit has supplanted the older form of rent security, a mortgage upon the
tenant's chattels. Deposits are only rarely placed in the hands of third persons. See,
further, JACOBS, CASES ON LANDLORD AND TENANT (1932) 560; TWANY, LANDLORD AND
TENANT (1910) § 323.
2. Sutton v. Goodman, 194 Mass. 389, 80 N. E. 608 (1907); Hecklau v. Hauser, 71
N. J. L. 478, 59 Atl. 18 (1904); Scott v. Montells, 109 N. Y. 1, 15 N. E. 729 (1888);
Chaude v. Shepard, 122 N. Y. 397, 25 N. E. 358 (1890); see Alvord v. Banfield, 85
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sible, however, for the landlord to evade this rule. One method, sometimes
successful, is to include in the lease a clause stipulating that the sum required
of the lessee is an advance payment of rent, or a "further consideration for the
execution of the lease." The words have been taken to indicate an intention
of the parties that upon a premature expiration of the lease, except through
his own default, the landlord may retain the fund regardless of the actual dam-
ages he has suffered.3 But the prospective lessee ordinarily commands suffi-
cient bargaining power to refuse to place himself so unqualifiedly in the lessor's
power. And even where the parties call the transfer an advance payment or
"further consideration," the courts have in some cases refused to accept the
consequences of the use of such terms and have confined the lessor to actual
damages. 4 A second device available to the landlord is a provision that upon
default by the lessee the deposit shall be retained as liquidated damages.
Most courts, however, are reluctant to enforce such clauses,' especially when
the only damage suffered is the rent unpaid at the time of the re-entry. The
lessor is consequently permitted to keep only that part of the security deposit
which he would have retained in the absence of a liquidated damage provision.
7
Ore. 49, 56, 166 Pac. 549, 551 (1917); Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash. 683, 688, 212 Pac.
1057, 1059 (1923). The deposit must also be returned in case of rescission, Hanley v.
General Petroleum Corp., 107 Cal. App. 496, 290 Pac. 496 (1930), or surrender by operation
of law, Hargrove v. Bourne, 47 Old. 484, 150 Pac. 121 (1915); Meagher v. Eilers Music
House, 77 Ore. 70, 150 Pac. 266 (1915).
3. In re Sun Drug Co., 4 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925); Ramish v. Workman, 33
Cal. App. 19, 164 Pac. 26 (1917); Schoen v. New Britain Trust Co., 111 Conn. 466, 150
AtI. 696 (1930); cf. Phegley v. Enke's City Dye Works, 127 Ore. 539, 272 Pac. 898 (1928).
Provision is often made for the return of the "further consideration" upon faithful per-
formance of the lease. Cf. Curtis v. Arnold, 43 Cal. App. 97, 184 Pac. 510 (1919); Wood
v. Hipwell, 107 Cal. App. 680, 290 Pac. 1040 (1930). The lessor must return advance
rent if the lease is terminated through his own default, see Sinclair v. Burke, 133 Ore.
115, 118, 287 Pac. 686, 687 (1930), though he need not if the action of third parties is
responsible, Brown v. Wall, 186 Mo. App. 150, 171 S. W. 586 (1914), nor, perhaps, in
case of fire, Harvey v. Weisbaum, 159 Cal. 265, 113 Pac. 656 (1911). Contra: Porter v.
Tull, 6 Wash. 408, 33 Pac. 965 (1893). Presumably a reletting by the landlord at an
equal or even higher rental will not affect his right to retain an advance payment or
"further consideration."
4. Jensen v. Sparkes, 53 F. (2d) 433 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Rez v. Summers, 34 Cal.
App. 527, 168 Pac. 156 (1917); Johnson v. Englestein, 236 Ill. App. 215 (1925); Cunning-
ham v. Stockton, 81 Kan. 780, 106 Pac. 1057 (1910); Cain v. Brown, 105 Ohio St. 264,
136 N. E. 916 (1922); Stern v. Green, 127 Wash. 429, 221 Pac. 601 (1923).
5. Advance Amusement Co. v. Franke, 268 Ill. 579, 109 N. E. 471 (1915); Caesar
v. Rubinson, 174 N. Y. 492, 67 N. E. 58 (1903); Stimpson v. Minsker Realty Co., 177
App. Div. 536, 164 N. Y. Supp. 465 (1st Dep't 1917); cf. In re Scholtz-Mutual Drug Co.,
298 Fed. 539 (D. Colo. 1924). But cf. Feyer v. Reiss, 154 App. Div. 272, 138 N. Y. Supp.
964 (2nd Dep't 1912); Phegley v. Enke's City Dye Works, supra note 3; Barrett v. Monro,
69 Wash. 229, 124 Pac. 369 (1912).
6. Star Mortgage Co. v. Friedland, 144 N. Y. Supp. 704 (Sup. Ct. 1913); cf. Yuen
Suey v. Fleshman, 65 Ore. 606, 133 Pac. 803 (1913).
7. The courts will enforce a liquidated damage clause only if the amount fixed is not
unreasonable in view of the actual damage, see cases cited supra note 5, and if the exact
damages are difficult to ascertain, cf. Jennings v. First National Bank of Kansas City, 225
The so-called "survival" clause, developed in New York,8 offers the landlord a
more effective means of accomplishing his purpose. In case of dispossession
it authorizes him to re-enter the premises and relet them "as the agent" of
the tenant, who agrees to be liable for any deficiency in rent. When such
a clause is included in the lease, the courts, apparently willing to alleviate the
harshness of the common-law rule, hold that the landlord may retain the de-
posit as security for deficiencies throughout the remainder of the original term.9
Although the lease terminates with the dispossess proceedings, the independent
deficiency covenant is said to survive.10 In practice, leases usually contain
both a survival and a liquidated damage clause. If the court enforces the
liquidated damage provision, the landlord at once becomes entitled to the whole
deposit. If the court refuses to sanction the liquidated damage clause, the
landlord may nevertheless retain the deposit by virtue of the survival clause.
The problems centering about the correlative rights of the tenant to the se-
curity deposit may be seen most clearly when the landlord is threatened with
insolvency. If the property has been mortgaged and a decline in real estate
values threatens to wipe out the lessor's equity in the premises, and if, in ad-
dition, there is a precipitate fall in the landlord's personal assets, the lessee, who
gave the security trusting in the holder's ownership of the land,'1 will wish to
take steps to prevent loss of his deposit. He may therefore default in payment
of the rent and, when the lessor brings summary proceedings to dispossess, he
may defend or counterclaim on the ground of "conversion." The assumed right
of action is based, of course, upon the theory that the deposit is a trust fund or
pledge.12  In different fact situations, courts in some jurisdictions, impressed
with the function of the deposit as security for future performance, have de-
Mo. App. 232, 30 S. W. (2d) 1049 (1930); Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N. Y. 167, 129 N.
E. 461 (1920).
S. The clause is intended to "survive" the effect of N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1921)
§ 1434, which provides that the issuing of a warrant in dispossess proceedings "annuls the
relation of landlord and tenant."
9. Lenco, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 247 N. Y. 44, 159 N. E. 718 (1928); Rosenfeld v. Aaron,
248 N. Y. 437, 162 N. E. 478 (1928).
10. Anzolone v. Paskusz, 96 App. Div. 188, 89 N. Y. Supp. 203 (1st De't 1904);
Halpern v. Manhattan Avenue Theatre Corp., 220 N. Y. 655, 115 N. E. 718 (1917); cf.
It re Homann, 45 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
11. See Levinson v. Shapiro, 238 App. Div. 158, 162, 263 N. Y. Supp. 585, 589 (1st
Dep't 1933).
12. Even were this construction adopted, the courts would refuse to permit the tenant
to recover his deposit where the landlord's alleged default consisted solely in mingling
the deposit with his own funds. Colantuoni v. Balene, 95 N. J. Eq. 748, 123 At. 541
(1923); Goodman v. Schached, 144 Misc. 905, 260 N. Y. Supp. 883 (Co. Ct. 1932);
cf. Sagone v. Mackey, 225 N. Y. 594, 122 N. E. 621 (1919). The obligation of the lessor
to pay interest on the deposit suggests that he be allowed to invest the money. See Jones
v. Wayne Circuit judge, 253 Mich. 515, 517, 235 N. W. 238, 239 (1931); Mendelson-Sil-
verman, Inc. v. Malco Trading Corp., 146 Misc. 215, 216, 260 N. Y. Supp. 881, 882 (Sup.
Ct. 1932); cf. Pintsch Compressing Co. v. Buffalo Gas Co., 280 Fed. 830, 840 (C. C. A.
2d, 1922); Matter of G. & G. Cigar Co., Inc., 131 Misc. 622, 227 N. Y. Supp. 102 (Co. Ct.
1928). The absence of an interest clause, it has been held, does not signify that the
deposit is to be kept intact. Levinson v. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 160, 263 N. Y. Supp.
at 587.
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clared that the relation between the parties with respect to the deposit is that of
pledgor and pledgee;' 3 and upon this assumption the tenant's action would
obviously lie. But the New York Appellate Division has refused to recognize
the lessee's claim for conversion, holding that the relationship is simply that of
debtor and creditor.' 4  Where a provision in the lease indicates that the parties
intended the transfer to vest in the landlord an absolute title to the fund, with
complete freedom of use,15 the deposit clearly cannot be considered a pledge.
But it might be said that in the absence of such a provision the lessee should
be deemed to have trusted in the relatively strong financial position of the lessor,
and that the latter should be charged with the continued possession of assets
at least equal to the amount of the security. However, the difficulty of draw-
ing a distinction for this purpose between the security deposit transaction and
the advance of funds to the landlord by an ordinary creditor, who also trusts in
the former's financial standing, would seem to favor the conclusion of the New
York courts. Moreover, treatment of the security deposit as a pledge would
afford only slight protection to the tenant, while it would cast upon the land-
lord an irritating and unnecessary burden. If the alleged conversion were
considered a defense to dispossess proceedings,' 6 so that the tenant might re-
tain possession under the lease in spite of the default, the lessee would never-
13. Reed v. Bristol County Realty Co., 250 Mass. 284, 145 N. E. 455 (1924); Kauf-
man v. Williams, 92 N. J. L. 182, 104 AtI. 202 (1918); Colantuoni v. Balene, supra note
12; cf. In re See, 209 Fed. 172 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Rasmussen v. Helen Realty Co., 92 Ind.
App. 278, 168 N E. 717 (1929) (deposit subsequently pledged for personal debt owed by
lessee to lessor); Degnario v. Sire, 34 Miss. 163, 68 N. Y. Supp. 789 (Sup. Ct. 1901).
14. Mendelson-Silverman, Inc. v. Malco Trading Corp., 262 N. Y. Supp. 991 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1933), aff'g 146 Misc. 215, 260 N. Y. Supp. 881 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Levinson
v. Shapiro, supra note 11; Jahmes Co., Inc. v. Propper, 238 App. Div. 326, 264 N. Y. Supp.
219 (1st Dep't 1933); cf. Houston Varick Operating Corp. v. 206-208 Varick Street Corp.,
142 Misc. 863, 255 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Mun. Ct. 1932); Goodman v. Schached, supra note
12; Editorial, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 5, 1926. Several of the lower New York courts have
apparently misconstrued the effect of Atlas v. Moritz, 217 App. Div. 38, 216 N. Y. Supp.
490 (4th Dep't 1926), where, because the lease provided that the security be held "in
escrow," a deposit of the fund in the business account of the lessor and a reduction in
that account below the amount of the security was held a conversion. The holding was
extended, at least in principle, to leases with no such peculiar provisions in Alumor Gar-
age, Inc. v. Stivers, Inc., 128 Misc. 400, 218 N. Y. Supp. 683 (Mun. Ct. 1926); Euclid
Holding Co. v. Kermacoe Realty Co., Inc., 131 Misc. 466, 227 N. Y. Supp. 103 (Mun. Ct.
1928); Frost v. Paulster Realty Corp., 138 Misc. 597, 247 N. Y. Supp. 808 (Co. Ct. 1930).
The peculiar fact situations in each of these cases, however, robbed of any practical effect
the declaration that a trust relationship existed. For analogous cases where the relation-
ship was held that of debtor and creditor, cf. Wilcox v. Gauntlett, 200 Mich. 272, 166
N. W. 856 (1918) (deposit as security for performance of continuing sales agreement);
Matter of G. & G. Cigar Co., Inc., supra note 12 (security for faithful performance of
employment contract).
15. Cf. Mendelson-Silverman, Inc. v. Malco Trading Corp., supra note 12 (provision
that security be deposited by landlord with trust company six months before termination
of lease); Houston Varick Operating Corp. v. 206-208 Varick Street Corp., supra note
14 (tenant protected by personal guaranty of repayment by defendant's officers).
16. Conversion of pledged securities is a defense to an action on the principal obliga-
tion. Sproul v. Sloan, 241 Pa. 284, 88 Atl. 501 (1913).
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theless be obliged to pay the past due installments of rent for non-payment of
which the proceedings were instituted.17  And if this is a condition to his re-
tention of possession, he may presumably accomplish the same object by pay-
ing the rent when the proceedings are brought, without accusing the landlord
of a breach of duty. A court decision that the landlord had "converted" the
deposit would merely force the lessor to replenish the security less rent un-
paid.18 If, on the other hand, the tenant consents to the termination of his
lease and employs the claim of conversion as a counterclaim to the dispossess
proceedings, a decision in his favor would give him no more than a tenant is
ordinarily entitled to on being dispossessed,19 unless the landlord is protected
by a survival clause. Apparently, therefore, the only effect of giving the
lessee such a right of action would be to escape the operation of a survival
clause, a result the desirability of which is open to serious doubt. The tenant,
moreover, could easily protect his interest in the deposit without a judicial rul-
ing that it constitutes a pledge. Particularly today, he probably would be
able to require that the landlord post a bond guarantying the return of the
security.
When, therefore, a tenant seeks to recover a deposit merely because of the
threatened insolvency of the landlord, the holding of the New York courts that
the relation between the parties is that of debtor and creditor seems justified.
So long as they remain in the position of lessor and lessee, the tenant should
have no right of action upon the debt until it becomes due. The consequences
of that rule should not apply, however, when for any reason the deposit in the
hands of its then holder loses its essential function of security for compliance
with the lease. The most frequently recurring situation in which this problem
arises, although it is not productive of extensive litigation, is where the lessor
assigns his reversion but fails to transfer the deposit to the grantee. The
New York courts early declared that the covenant to return the deposit is
personal to the lessor and does not run with the land.2 0 Accordingly, the
17. See Euclid Holding Co. v. Kermacoe Realty Co., Inc., supra note 14, at 470, 227
N. Y. Supp. at 107.
18. Ibid.
19. In the absence of a survival clause the tenant may recover the full amount of the
deposit, less rent unpaid at the time of the dispossession. See note 2, supra. If the tenant
remains in possession he should clearly not be given a right of action for that portion of
the security which the landlord has dissipated or "converted." For even if the lessee
recovered for the "conversion," he would be required, if he elected to retain possession,
to abide by his contract to maintain the security. Atlas v. Moritz, supra note 14, at 42,
216 N. Y. Supp. at 495. And this would involve the anomalous result of a recovery of
damages by the lessee on condition that he immediately repay what he has recovered.
20. Fallert Brewing Co. v. Blass, 119 App. Div. 53, 103 N. Y. Supp. 865 (2d Dep't
1907); Mauro v. Alvino, 90 Misc. 328, 152 N. Y. Supp. 963 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Cohen v.
Birns, 170 N. Y. Supp. 560 (Sup. Ct. 1918); cf. Knutsen v. Cinque, 113 App. Div. 677,
99 N. Y. Supp. 911 (2d Dep't 1906). The burden runs in Michigan, Moskin v. Gold-
stein, 225 Mich. 389, 196 N. W. 415 (1923); see (1924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 432. In Shenk
v. Brewster, 189 App. Div. 603, 179 N. Y. Supp. 147 (1st Dep't 1919), it was held that
the obligation passed to the heirs of the lessor rather than to the administrators. A dis-
senting opinion protested vigorously that the burden does not run and should pass to
the lessor's personal representatives.
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grantee may not compel his grantor to transfer the deposit, 21 and he is not re-
sponsible to the tenant for its return.22 Furthermore, the same courts de-
cided, a grantor who retains the security does not become liable to the lessee un-
til the termination of the lease.23  If, however, a grantor conveys the rever-
sion but retains the security, it becomes impossible for him to enforce claims
upon the deposit for defaults which damage his grantee,24 and the function of
the deposit as security for the tenant's performance is consequently destroyed.25;
During the New York City rent emergency of 1920-24 a statute was passed
providing that a landlord who granted or assigned his reversion must transfer
the deposit to his grantee or assignee, or return it to the tenant, or notify the
tenant of the address of the transferee "and whether the same has been turned
over . . .,,26 Previously the tenant had no way of knowing to whom he might
look for repayment; 27 and the statute presumably succeeded at least in pro-
viding such notice. But since the implication that the grantor might elect to
21. See Mauro v. Alvino, supra note 20, at 329, 152 N. Y. Supp. at 964; Pollack v.
Jackson, 124 Misc. 608, 609, 209 N. Y. Supp. 120, 122 (City Ct. 1925).
22. Fallert Brewing Co. v. Blass; Cohen v. Birns, both supra note 20.
23. Mauro v. Alvino, supra note 20.
24. Knutsen v. Cinque, supra note 20; Richards v. Browning, 214 App. Div. 665, 212
N. Y. Supp. 738 (1st Dep't 1925). In Seidlitz v. Auerbach, supra note 7, where the
landlord sold the reversion, this rule operated to destroy the advantage to him of the
survival clause.
25. An argument to the contrary exists. It has been said, as a reason for denying
the tenant immediate recovery of the security from a grantor who retains it, that the
grantee is "entitled to the benefit" thereof, and might derive an advantage from its reten-
tion by the grantor. See Mauro v. Alvino, supra note 20, at 330, 152 N. Y. Supp. at
964; Halsted v. Globe Indemnity Co., 258 N. Y. 176, 180, 179 N. E. 376, 378 (1932) ; Pollack
v. Jackson, sura note 21, at 610, 209 N. Y. Supp. at 122. In the Alvino case the court
argued that while the grantor could not counterclaim in his own right for defaults by
the lessee, the grantee at the expiration of the term could assign his chose in action to
the grantor, who might then counterclaim. Since, however, it does not appear that this
roundabout procedure has ever been pursued, and since the difficulties in the way of
its adoption are quite obvious, an argument based upon the efficacy of such a procedural
device becomes matter of theory rather than of fact. The assignment and counterclaim
suggest that the grantee's hopes of deriving a benefit from the deposit depend upon the
will of the grantor. But in Pollack v. Jackson, supra note 21, where at the end of the
lease the grantee demanded a portion of the security from the grantor, against whom
the tenant brought suit for the deposit, the court allowed the grantor to interplead the
grantee by virtue of the N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1921) § 287. The implication of such
permission to interplead is that if the grantor had paid the tenant he would be liable
to the grantee to the amount of the latter's claim. Pouch v. Prudential Insurance Co.,
204 N. Y. 281, 97 N. E. 731 (1912). It would be absurd for the New York courts to
refuse to allow the grantee to compel the transfer of the security, and yet give him an
enforceable claim upon the grantor at the moment the latter contemplates returning it to
the tenant. But cf. Maylayne Cqrp. v. Markantonis, infra note 41.
26. N. Y. PENAL LAw (Supp. 1924) § 1302-a.
27. Testimony before the New York Legislative Commission on Housing and Regional
Planning portrays the injustice to tenants resulting from the legal rules as applied during
the housing shortage of the early nineteen twenties. Report of Commission on Housing
and Regional Planning, N. Y. LEGriSLATIW DOCUmIeNTS (1924), No. 43, p. 26.
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retain the deposit soon received judicial recognition,2 8 the rule formerly estab-
lished by the courts was not materially altered. However, because the lower
courts held that even under the statute a grantor did not absolve himself from
liability for repayment merely by transferring the deposit to the grantee and
notifying the tenant,29 the New York legislature found it necessary to make its
intentions upon this point more clear by the adoption of an amendment. 30
The new statute in effect preserves to the grantor the same alternatives of action
which he enjoyed under the old, but in addition it provides that the transfer
of the security will relieve him from liability to the tenant, and impose such
liability upon the transferee.31
The result affords adequate protection to the grantor. And since the grantee
probably commands sufficient bargaining power to insist upon a transfer of the
deposit if he so desires, it was perhaps unnecessary to afford him further pro-
tection. But from the tenant's point of view the present statute leaves much
to be desired. The retention of the deposit by the grantor, while of no substan-
tial benefit to either grantor32 or grantee, is distinctly prejudicial to the tenant.
Since the lessee presumably relies upon the lessor's ownership of the premises
as security for the promise to repay the deposit,33 his interest demands that
the obligation of repayment should follow the ownership of the land. The
most effective protection for the tenant would be afforded if the statute provided
that the covenant to repay should run with the land.34  But a rule binding the
grantee to repay the deposit whether or not he has received it seems quite
unjustified. A more equitable solution could be effected by a statute com-
pelling the grantor either to transfer the deposit to his grantee or, if the grantee
refused to accept it, to return it to the tenant. The suggested statute would
afford the grantee protection by way of security for the lease with which
he is burdened; it would impose no undue burden upon the grantor; and at
the same time it would obviate the injustice of requiring the tenant to main-
tain a deposit after its purpose has been lost.36
28. Trebuhs Realty Co., Inc., v. Pieschell, 132 Misc. 517, 519, 229 N. Y. Supp. 788,
790 (Mun. Ct. 1928).
29. Trebuhs Realty Co., Inc. v. Pieschell, supra note 28; Madison Realty Co. v. Weiss,
133 Misc. 318, 232 N. Y. Supp. 43 (Sup. Ct. 1928). It was later held that assumption
of the obligation by the grantee relieved the grantor of responsibility. Rosenfeld v. Aaron,
supra note 9.
30. N. Y. Pu._AL LAW (Supp. 1933) § 1302-a.
31. The statute was, moreover, extended to embrace a transfer of the reversion by
conveyance in an action to foreclose a mortgage. Also, a failure to comply with the
statute was definitely made a misdemeanor, in place of the former presumption of a mis-
demeanor.
32. The grantor presumably desires to use the money and is unwilling to repay it
until it is absolutely necessary for him to do so. However, it seems undesirable to give
the grantor what amounts to a loan for a period ending with the expiration of the term.
33. See note 11, supra.
34. See the result effected in Moskin v. Goldstein, supra note 20.
35. See cases cited in note 22, supra; Rybre Realty Co. v. Wolff, Inc., 122 Misc. 672, 203
N. Y. Supp. 409 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
36. The question also arises whether, after an assignment of the term, the lessee or
his assignee is entitled to the return of the security deposit at the expiration of the lease.
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When the premises change hands as a result of foreclosure proceedings,
the suggested rule compelling a transfer of the deposit either to purchaser or
tenant seems equally applicable. Ordinarily the purchaser at foreclosure sale
should be entitled to the deposit and thus to a deduction of this amount from
the contemplated purchase price. Where the purchase price exceeds the amount
of the mortgage plus the deposit, such deduction will affect only the mortgagor,
who is in no position to complain. Where no excess appears, however, the al-
lowance of the purchaser's claim would be preudicial to the rights of the
mortgagee, and should be permitted only if the mortgage were subsequent to
the lease and the mortgagee had notice of the existence of the security depositA
7
If the purchaser does not accept the transfer, the tenant should be accorded the
same rights which the purchaser at his option could have had. The simplest
procedure would be to give the tenant an equitable lien upon the purchase price
as against the mortgagor 8 and subsequent mortgagees with notice.39  Where
the mortgage is prior to the lease and the tenant is forced to vacate he should
clearly secure a lien upon the purchase price, but only upon the amount by
which it exceeds the mortgage.40  If the prior mortgagee does not join the
tenant as a party to the foreclosure proceedings, and permits him to remain in
possession,41 the situation is analogous to a foreclosure by a subsequent mort-
The New York courts hold that in the absence of an express assignment of the right to
the deposit, it remains with the assignor and does not pass with an assignment of the
term. Shattuck v. Buek, 158 App. Div. 709, 143 N. Y. Supp. 1045 (1st Dep't 1913);
Nemtzoff v. Vagnier, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1075 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Goodale Real Estate Corp.
v. Subridge Holding Corp., 139 Misc. 587, 248 N. Y. Supp. 663 (Mun. Ct. 1931).
37. See note 39, infra.
38. For examples of equitable liens based upon implied contract in analogous situations,
cf. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U. S. 227 (1896); National Surety Co. v.
County Board of Education, 15 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Columbia Graphophone
Co. v. 330 W. 95th St. Corp., 269 Fed. 190 (S. D. N. Y. 1920); Wright v. Buchanan,
287 111. 468, 123 N. E. 53 (1919). See Note (1931) 31 CoL. L. REV. 1335. Since, unless
the mortgagor is insolvent, the recovery of the deposit by the purchaser or tenant will
not prejudice other creditors, the lien will operate simply to avoid the necessity of a suit
against the mortgagor.
39. A mortgagee or purchaser with notice of an equitable lien takes the land subject
to that lien. 2 PomEROY, EQuIly JURisPRuDENcE (4th ed. 1918) § 688. If the lease is
for a period of more than three years, it can be recorded in New York, N. Y. RYAL PRop.
LAw (1909) §§ 290, 291, and the mortgagee will thereby have notice of the deposit.
Possession under an unrecorded lease is actual notice to a subsequent mortgagee, City
Bank of Bayonne v. Hocke, 168 App. Div. 83, 153 N. Y. Supp. 731 (1st Dep't 1915),
but this will not necessarily be notice of the existence of a deposit, unless the mortgagee
has also examined a copy of the lease. See Herubin v. Malackowski, 113 Misc. 100, 184
N. Y. Supp. 829 (Co. Ct. 1920).
40. If the lien attaches only to the surplus, it will operate only against the mortgagor,
and will be unaffected by the recording acts.
41. The New York Court of Appeals has recently ruled, where this situation was pre-
sented, that the "right" to the deposit which a prior mortgagee acquires by foreclosure
entitles a purchaser through him to an injunction restraining the mortgagor from return-
ing the security to the tenant. Maylayne Corp. v. Markantonis, 262 N. Y. 354, 186 N. E.
862 (1933). Since the priority of the mortgage suggests that the deposit was intended
as security for the mortgagee as well as for the mortgagor, this exception to the usual
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gagee, except that the prior mortgagee must in no event be prejudiced by the
existence of the deposit. If, therefore, the new owner wishes to acquire the
security, he should be permitted to deduct from the purchase price only so
much as is in excess of the mortgage. Should this amount be less than the full
deposit, he must be confined to an action against the 'mortgagor for the balance.
Similarly, if the purchaser does not elect to take the deposit, the tenant's lien
upon the purchase price should be inferior to that of the prior mortgagee.
When the premises change hands not as a result of foreclosure proceedings
but because of the bankruptcy of the lessor, the problem is complicated by the
rights of other creditors. It might be argued that upon liquidation of the es-
tate, precisely as in the case of a simple transfer of the reversion, the pur-
chaser should be permitted, at his option, to take over the deposit and deduct
that amount from the purchase price. However, the effect of such action in a
bankruptcy proceeding would be indirectly to accord the tenant a preference
in the distribution of the estate; for presumably he would be able to collect the
full deposit from the purchaser at the termination of the lease. The issue
would be squarely presented if the purchaser refused to assume the obliga-
tion of the deposit and the tenant sought to establish a claim upon the pur-
chase price superior to that of the trustee. The status of the tenant and of
other creditors may on one ground be distinguished. Ordinarily when credit is
advanced to the landlord, reliance is placed only upon the debtor's general
financial condition. But, as has been said, the tenant's hope of recovering
probably rests upon the landlord's ownership of the particular premises sub-
ject to the lease.42 Accordingly, it might be contended, the tenant should be
allowed a claim upon the proceeds of the sale of the premises superior to that
of an ordinary creditor. 43  On the other hand, there is equal merit in the argtr-
ment that the claim of the tenant should not be distinguished from any other
contract debt and that a result which, directly or indirectly, accorded the ten-
ant a preference in the estate would not be justified.44 If the latter position
were adopted, the tenant would be confined to a general claim in bankruptcy,
but he would be at least partially compensated for the loss he sustained there-
by, since he would be relieved of the burden of maintaining a security deposit.
rule is logical enough. The suggested statute, however, would obviate the cumbersome
procedure necessitated by the present state of the law, and would protect the tenant from
dissipation of his deposit by the mortgagor, who probably is in a position of questionable
financial strength.
42. Such is manifestly the case where the parties stipulate that if the tenant com-
plies with the terms of the lease, the amount deposited shall be credited on the last few
months' rental.
43. See notes 38 and 39, supra; 2 P GToN, BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1915) § 1150.
44. In re Banner, 149 Fed. 936 (S. D. N. Y. 1907).
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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
ARTICLE 3, Section 1 of the Constitution vests "the judicial power of the United
States" in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may
from time to time establish. In the same section these tribunals are made
independent of Congress to the extent that their judges are to hold office
during good behavior and to receive compensation which cannot be diminished.
Section 2 defines the scope of "the judicial power," limiting it to stipulated
cases and controversies; and pursuant to the doctrine of the separation of
powers the Supreme Court early declared that such cases and controversies
could not include matters wherein the legislative or executive departments
had the power of ultimate determination.' In order to carry out functions
reserved to the legislature by the Constitution, however, Congress found it
necessary to establish tribunals to hear disputes and submit opinions as to
their proper disposition. Power to do so was said to lie outside of Article 3,
and it was consequently decided that such bodies need not be subject to the
constitutional limitations imposed upon courts exercising "the judicial power.":
It follows, moreover, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, that these legis-
lative courts "are incapable of receiving" 3 any part of "the judicial power
of the United States."
One would expect to find, therefore, a simple, consistent doctrine of con-
stitutional law to the effect that there are two sets of courts, "constitutional"
and "legislative;" that the provisions of Article 3 apply to the former but
not to the latter; that their functions are mutually exclusive; and, as was
early declared, that the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the
one set of courts and not over the other.4 An examination of the cases reveals,
however, that the same courts have been called constitutional in one case
1. Hay.burn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (U. S. 1792); United States v. Yale Todd (U. S. 1794),
reported in footnote to United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 52 (U. S. 1851). See United
States v. Ferreira, supra, at 48.
2. American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (U. S. 1828), was probably the first
recognition of this power by the Supreme Court. It was there applied to the Territorial
Courts which have uniformly been regarded as legislative courts ever since. Benner v.
Porter, 9 How. 235 (U. S. 1850); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 18 Wall. 648, 655 (U. S. 1873);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 154 (1878); McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S.
174, 180 et seq. (1891). The absence of restrictions on Congress's control in regard to the
Court of Claims was similarly acknowledged. Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561, 117
U. S. 697, 699 (1864). For an excellent article on the legislative courts, see Katz, Federal
Legislative Courts (1930) 43 HAxv. L. Rav. 894.
3. American Insurance Co. v. Canter, supra note 2, at 546.
4. "The appellate power and jurisdiction are subject to such exceptions and regulations
as Congress shall make. But appeal is given [by the Constitution] only from such in-
ferior courts as Congress may ordain and establish to carry into effect the judicial power
specifically granted to the United States. . . And Congress cannot extend the appellate
power of this Court beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution, and can neither
confer nor impose on it the authority or duty of hearing and determining an appeal from
a Commissioner or Auditor, or any other tribunal exercising only special powers under an
act of Congress. . ." Gordon v. United States, supra note 2, at 702.
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and legislative in another; that since a court may be both constitutional and
legislative, it is not always possible to tell to which courts the provisions of
Article 3 will apply; that some cases may be brought either in courts unequivo-
cally called legislative or in the federal district courts; and that the Supreme
Court freely reviews cases decided by courts performing a legislative function.
The histories of the decisions upon the status of the Court of Claims and of
the District of Columbia courts graphically portray the dialectical confusion.
Since "controversies to which the United States shall be a party" are in-
cluded in the constitutional enumeration of the judicial powers, it might have
been concluded, in accordance with the reasoning in Chisholm v. Georgia,5
that claims against the United States were within the jurisdiction of the judi-
ciary. Apparently, however, the principle that a sovereign cannot be sued
without its consent 6 was thought to preclude this interpretation of the pro-
visions of Article 3, for until 1855 creditors of the United States presented
their demands directly to Congress. IEn that year the legislature, finding the
burden too great, established a tribunal to investigate such claims and report
its conclusions to Congress. 7 Subsequently this body was authorized to render
final decisions from which an appeal was granted to the Supreme Court. 8 That
Congress thought it was acting under the provisions of Article 3 is shown by
the fact that the judges were granted unlimited tenure.9 Moreover, the Court
of Claims looked upon itself as a constitutional court,10 scholars were of the
5. 2 Dall. 419 (U. S. 1793). In this case, the first to interpret Article 3, Section 2 in
regard to suits against a state, the Supreme Court took jurisdiction of a suit against the
state of Georgia by a citizen of another state even though the sovereign defendant had not
given its consent. In spite of a vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Iredell, the majority were
persuaded that the express provisions of Article 3 not only provided a tribunal for the
suit but also showed that the states had yielded their sovereign immunity for this purpose.
The same reasoning would, of course, have applied to the United States. The immediate
reaction to this decision was the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, excluding from the
judicial power of the United States suits against a state by citizens of another state. This
Amendment overlooked the possibility of a suit against a state by one of its of-t citizens,
but the sovereign immunity was held to include this situation also. Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U. S. 1 (1890). The latter case seriously questioned the conclusion of Chisholm v. Georgia.
6. The Supreme Court later definitely expressed the view that a sovereignty was immune
from suit without its consent. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353 (1907). Mr.
Justice Holmes delivered the opinion. For a discussion of the development of this doctrine
in England and the United States, see Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34
YALE L. J. 1, 5 et seq.; (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 1, 38 et seq.
7. 10 STAT. 612 (1855).
S. 12 STAT. 765 (1863), 28 U. S. C. § 252 (1926).
9. Both acts (supra notes 7 and 8) granted the judges tenure during good behavior.
The Act of 1863 increased the number of judges from 3 to 5. For a history of the Court
of Claims, see RxcmADsoN, HisTomz, JURISDICTION AM PAcrICE OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS
(2d ed. 1885) ; Katz, supra note 2, at 904.
10. This is evident from the words of Chief Justice Richardson of the Court of Claims,
explaining the jurisdiction of its judges over non-judicial matters not reviewable by the
Supreme Court: "I am also aware that the Supreme Court held in an early decision, reported
in a note to Ferreira's Case [United States v. Yale Todd, supra note 1] that a technically
judicial court cannot constitutionally be authorized to perform extra-judicial services; but
I can see no reason why judges acting collectively in the name of the court may not volun-
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same opinion," and although the Supreme Court at first gave some indication
to the contrary, 12 several of its early opinions concurred in this view.'3  Even
as recently as 1925, an act levying an income tax on the salaries of the judges
of the Court of Claims was declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
constituted a legislative encroachment upon the immunities of the judicial
department. 14  The opinion did not directly discuss the question whether the
court was legislative or constitutional, but the doctrine of the separation of
powers, upon which the decision was based, would not have been applicable
to a court not exercising "the judicial power of the United States."
In Ex parte Bakelite Corporation,'5 however, the premises, reasoning and
dicta of these cases were swept aside. In upholding the jurisdiction of the
Court of Customs Appeals 16 over a case not within "the judicial power," the
Supreme Court analogized the status of that tribunal to the Court of Claims,
which, it was now said, had "always" been considered a legislative court.
Ample proof of this could, indeed, be found. The Court of Claims had been
created to exercise the legislative function, previously performed by Congress
itself, of investigating claims against the United States; in one early case the
Supreme Court had refused to review the court's decisions because their deter-
minations could not be final; 17 and it had been established that there was
tarily perform services when designated to do so by act of Congress, as well as judges
of the Supreme Court designated by their official position to sit in other extra judicial
tribunals. Act of January 29, 1887, ch. 37, sec. 2; 19 STAT. L., 228." Sanborn v. United
States, 27 Ct. Cl. 485, 490 (1892). See also Harriet T. James v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl.
615, 630 (1903).
11. Biacx, CobSn~un ONAL LAW (4th ed. 1927) § 98; 2 WATSON, TE CONSnTunxON.
oF THE UNITED STATEs (2d ed. 1929) § 789.
12. See Gordon v. United States, supra note 2, at 699.
13. In United States v. Union Pacific Rr. Co., 98 U. S. 569, 603 (1878), Mr. justice Miller
said: "We say therefore, that, with the exception of the Supreme Court the authority of
Congress in creating courts and conferring on them all or little of the judicial power of
the United States, is unlimited by the Constitution.
"Congress under this authority [referring to Article 3] created the district courts, the
circuit courts and the Court of Claims and vested each of them with a defined portion of
the judicial power found in the Constitution." And again in Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185
U. S. 373 (1902), the Court said, at 386: "While the United States as a government may
not be sued without its consent, yet with its consent it may be sued, and the judicial power
of the United States extends to such a controversy. Indeed, the whole jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims rests upon this proposition.' This language was quoted with approval in
Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 342 (1907).
14. Miles v. Graham, 268 U. S. 501 (1925).
15. 279 U. S. 438 (1929). Discussed in Katz, supra note 2; Comment (1930) 24 IL..
L. Rzv. 820; Comment (1930) 10 B. U. L. REv. 81; Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment,
Supervision and Renzoval-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution (1930) 28 MIcH. L.
Rzv. 485, 518, n. 87; Note (1933) 46 HARv. L. REmv. 677, 678.
16. The Court of Customs Appeals was created by the Act of August 5, 1909, 36 STAT.
11, 105-108 (1909), 28 U. S. C. §§ 301, 308, 309 (1926), to hear appeals from the Board
of General Appraisers. While the Bakelite case was pending, its name was changed to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and it was invested with jurisdiction to review de-
cisions of the Commissioner of Patents. 45 STAT. 1475 (1929), 28 U. S. C. Supp. III §§ 301a,
309a (1929). For a short history, see Katz, supra note 2, at 908 et seq.
17. Gordon v. United States, supra note 2.
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no right to a jury trial in the Court of Claims since Congress had power to
dictate the conditions upon which it would consent to be sued.' 8 The reason-
ing of the Bakelite case could be considered mere dictum in the same manner
as the earlier expressions it repudiated. But its conclusions have recently
been confirmed by a square holding. In Williams v. United States,19 it was
decided that the salary of a judge of the Court of Claims could be reduced
under the terms of the Legislative Appropriation Act of June 30, 1932.20
Counsel and the Court directed all their attention to the question whether the
Court of Claims was a legislative or constitutional court, and in an exhaustive
opinion Mr. Justice Sutherland reaffirmed the position adopted in the Bakelite
case. A dictum in an early case2 ' to the effect that when the government
consents to be sued "the judicial power of the United States" immediately
attaches, was explained as a misinterpretation of the provisions of Article 3.
For the judicial power, it was pointed out, is therein extended to all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; but in the subsequent clause, mentioning
controversies to which the United States shall be a party, the comprehensive
"all" is omitted. Consequently, it is possible to reason that claims against
the United States are not comprehended within the judicial power and, there-
fore, that the Court of Claims is not a constitutional court. But this rational-
ization cannot be accepted without ignoring further logical difficulties. The
Tucker Act of 1887 22 confers upon the federal district courts jurisdiction con-
current with the Court of Claims over all claims against the United States
wherein the amount does not exceed $10,000. It was early declared, however,
that the district courts can accept only cases within "the judicial power of
the United States. '23  Thus, the above theory leads to the anomalous result
that whether or not a particular case is one included within the provisions
of Article 3 depends upon which court hears it.
Similarly, if the Court of Claims is a legislative court, the question arises
how the Supreme Court can logically consent to review its decisions. When
the issue was first presented, the Supreme Court, in Gordon v. United States,
24
denied that it had such power. The decision was placed upon the ground
that by express provision of the act conferring upon it appellate power over
the Court of Claims, no award was to be paid a claimant against the United
States unless an appropriation was made by the Secretary of the Treasury.25
But the opinion argued further that, even in the absence of this provision, pay-
ment would depend upon an appropriation by Congress and that therefore
the judicial determination of any claim against the United States would be
18. McElrath v. United States, 102 U. S. 426 (1880).
19. 289 U. S. 553 (1933). Noted in (1933) 47 HARv. L. REV. 133; (1933) 22 GEO. L. J.
91.
20. 47 STAT. 382, 402 (1932), 5 U. S. C. Sus'. VI § 673 n. (1932).
21. Minnesota v. Hitchcock; cf. United States v. Union Pacific Rr. Co., both supra note
13.
22. 24 STAT. 505 (1837), 28 U. S. C. §41 (20) (1926).
23. Hayburn's Case; United States v. Yale Todd, both supra note 1.
24. Supra note 2.
25. 12 STAT. 765, § 14 (1863).
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subject to legislative approval. 26  Moreover, the Court, assuming that the
Court of Claims was not created under Article 3, declared that the Supreme
Court could not accept appeals from tribunals "exercising only special powers
under an act of Congress."12 7  Nevertheless, after the provision of the act
which had been found particularly objectionable had been repealed, the Court
ignored the language in the Gordon case and proceeded to review decisions of
the Court of Claims.28 Twenty years later, when the question was again
directly presented, the Court expressly affirmed its power to do so.29 Since
that time appeals from the Court of Claims have been rejected only where
Congress has expressly provided that the decision shall merely be advisory.3
It is of course unlikely that Congress will in any case overrule a decision of
the Supreme Court by refusing to make an appropriation. However, the legis-
lature has several times indicated that it considers the final settlement of claims
against the United States within its own discretion. In one instance an act
was passed denying the Court of Claims jurisdiction over suits by pardoned
southerners after the Civil War and abrogating the Supreme Court's appellate
power in such cases even after judgments had been obtained in the Court of
Claims. 31  The Supreme Court declared this act unconstitutional.32  But on
another occasion the Supreme Court refused to interfere when similar action
was taken as to certain claims and judgments against the District of Col-
umbia.33 Apparently the Court felt that other provisions would be made for
these claimants. Recently, Congress has asserted its power over the disposition
of claims against the United States in another way. A petitioner obtained a
judgment in the Court of Claims and the government did not appeal.34 Dis-
26. Supra note 2, at 699. ".... and if he [the Secretary of the Treasury] should decide
in favor of the claimant it will then rest with Congress to determine whether they will or
will not make an appropriation for its payment. Neither court can by any process enforce
its judgment; but whether it is paid or not, does not depend upon the decision of either
court, but upon the future action of the Secretary of the Treasury and of Congress"
27. See note 4, supra.
28. E.g., De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419 (U. S. 1866).
29. United States v. Jones, 119 U. S. 477 (1886).
30. E.g., In re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222 (1893. This case was taken to the Court of
Claims by virtue of Section 12 of the Tucker Act, supra note 22, which provides that "when
any claim or matter is pending in any of the executive departments which involves contro-
verted questions of fact or law" such department may submit the matter to the Court of
Claims for a finding of facts and conclusion of law and "the court shall report its findings
to the department by which it was transmitted for its guidance and action."
31. 16 STAT. 235 (1870).
32. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (U. S. 1871).
33. In re Hall, 167 U. S. 38 (1897). The claimant sued in the Court of Claims under
jurisdiction provided by Act of Feb. 13, 1895, 28 STAT. 664 (1895). On appeal to the
Supreme Court his judgment was reversed because of a mistake in the allowance of interest
and remanded to the Court of Claims, where the claimant moved for an entry of judgment
without interest. The Court of Claims adjourned with the motion pending and before
reconvening the Act of Feb. 13, 1895 was repealed and all jurisdiction thereunder vacated
by the Act of March 3, 1897, 29 STAT. 665, 669 (1897). In District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183
U. S. 62 (1901), the same act repealed the cdurt's jurisdiction while a motion to set aside
the claimant's judgment was pending.
34. Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 91 (1930).
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satisfied with the result, Congress sent the case back to the Court of Claims
to hear new evidence.35  The court denied the claimant's motion to ignore
the remanding order,36 and the Supreme Court refused, without opinion, to
issue mandamus to restrain further proceedings in the case. 37  The conceptual
anomaly which arises when the Supreme Court accepts appeals from decisions
thus subject to Congressional action is apparent. For such cases cannot be
within "the judicial power of the United States"; yet if the Supreme Court
grants certiorari in a controversy it must be one enumerated in Article 3. Mr.
Justice Sutherland, in the Williams case, attempted to solve the dilemma by
saying that the whole of the judicial power is not included within Article 3,
and that when claims against the United States are heard, the Supreme Court
exercises a judicial power, but not "the judicial power of the United States."
38
The solution merely begs the question. It assumes the conclusion that, con-
sistently with the doctrine of the separation of powers, the same power can
be exercised both by an arm of the legislature and by the judiciary.
The decisions upon the status of the courts of the District of Columbia
are equally difficult to rationalize. Power was early given them to review
the rulings of the Commissioner of Patents, but their determinations were
subject to attack by any interested party in any federal court of appropriate
jurisdiction3 9 The capacity of the District courts to entertain such adminis-
trative functions was upheld without expressly calling the courts legislative;40
but when the Supreme Court refused to accept appeals in several patent cases
it was pointed out that such controversies were not within "the judicial power
of the United States."141  When the District courts heard these cases, it was
explained, they were exercising a function conferred upon them by the sover-
eign power of Congress to regulate patents.42  Subsequently Congress provided
for appeals to the Supreme Court from decisions of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reviewing rates established by the District Public Utility
35. 46 STAT. 1622 (1931).
36. Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 447 (1932), noted in
(1933) 46 HEav. L. REv. 677.
37. Ex parte Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co., 285 U. S. 526 (1932). Adversely criti-
cized in Sloss, Mandamus in the Supreme Court (1932) 46 HA.v. L. Rxv. 91, 114 et seq.
38. Williams v. United States, supra note 19, at 565, 566.
39. The first statute gave dissatisfied patent applicants an appeal from the Commissioner
of Patents' decision to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, but even the latter
court's decision did not preclude interested parties from further testing the validity of the
patent by a bill in equity in any competent court. 16 STAT. 205 (1870). The appeal was
later changed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals when the latter tribunal was
created. 27 STAT. 434, 436 (1893), 35 U. S. C. § 59 (1926).
40. See Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50, 60 (1884).
41. Frasch v. Moore, 211 U. S. 1 (1908) ; Atkins v. Moore, 212 U. S. 285 (1909) ; Bald-
win Co. v. Howard Co., 256 U. S. 35 (1921). But a patent application case involving
the validity of a rule of joinder of patents in the application may be such a final decision
as will give the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U. S. 543
(1904). It is also interesting to note that as late as 1920 the Supreme Court inadvertently
reviewed a trade-mark decision which was not final where the issue of its jurisdiction
was not raised. Beckwith v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U. S. 538 (1920). This was
later acknowledged as an error in Baldwin Co. v. Howard Co., supra, at 40.
42. See Butterworth v. Hoe, supra note 40, at 59.
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Commission.43 The Supreme Court again denied itself jurisdiction on the
ground that here also the District courts were exercising an administrative
function.44  The capacity of the District courts to act as an administrative
body was now explained upon the theory that Congress had a dual authority
over them. It could invest them not only with the powers exercised by the
constitutional courts, but also with the powers any state could confer upon
its courts. The patent cases were referred to as precedents for their "excep-
tional" and "advisory" duties. In the Bakelite case the District courts were
used as an example of legislative courts along with the Court of Claims.5
And when their jurisdiction to review decisions of the Radio Commission was
upheld, the Supreme Court once more declared that they "are not created
under the judiciary articles of the Constitution, but are legislative courts.140
But at the same time that the "legislative" concept was being used in order
to explain the District courts' extra-judicial functions, it was also necessary
for other purposes to analogize them to the constitutional courts. In one case
it was said that the District of Columbia Supreme Court was "a court of the
United States" within the terms of the statute providing for the apprehension
and holding of persons for trial.47 In this instance reliance was placed upon
the fact that the District courts had always considered themselves constitu-
tional courts and bound by the federal Judicial Code.48  On another occasion
the Supreme Court referred to the "parallelism" between the District courts
and the other federal courts as "complete.1
49
In O'Donoghue v. United States,50 heard and decided on the same days
as the Williams case, the Supreme Court definitely declared that the District
courts had been created under the terms of Article 3 and held that the salaries
of their judges could not be reduced. In another long opinion, Mr. Justice
Sutherland emphasized the constitutional right of the inhabitants of those
43. 37 STAT. 938, 974, 988 (1913).
44. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428 (1923).
45. Supra note 15, at 450: "A like view [meaning 'legislative' view] has been taken of the
status and jurisdiction of the courts provided by Congress for the District of Columbia.
These courts, this Court has held, are created in virtue of the power of Congress to 'exercise
exclusive legislation,' over the district made the seat of the government of the United States,
are legislative rather than constitutional courts, and may be clothed with the authority and
charged with the duty of giving advisory decisions in proceedings which are not cases or
controversies within the meaning of Article III, but are merely in aid of legislative or execu-
tive action, and therefore outside the admissible jurisdiction of courts established under that
Article."
46. Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 468 (1930): "In the
cases just cited [referring, among others, to Keller v. Potomac, supra note 44, and Butter-
worth v. Hoe, supra note 401 as also in others, it is recognized that the courts of the District
of Columbia are not created under the judiciary article of the Constitution but are legislative
courts and therefore that Congress may invest them with jurisdiction of appeals and pro-
ceedings such as have been just described."
47. Benson v. Henkel, 198 U. S. 1 (1905). The statute applied to the United States dis-
trict courts. 1 SrAT. 91 (1789), 18 U. S. C. § 591 (1926).
48. Hyattsville Building Association v. Bouic, 44 D. C. App. 408 (1916); cf. United
States v. Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co., 26 D. C. App. 581 (1906).
49. See Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U. S. 145, 156 (1927).
50. 289 U. S. 516 (1933).
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portions of Virginia and Maryland out of which the District of Columbia had
been carved, to have the judges who settled their disputes and interpreted
their laws independent of legislative control. Precedent for the decision was
found in the cases analogizing the District courts to the other federal courts;
the fact that in the Bakelite case they were used as examples of legislative
courts was dismissed as inadvertent dictum; and the even stronger language
of the case upholding their power to review the rulings of the Radio Com-
mission was not alluded to at all. But the major obstacle in the path to this
conclusion was the difficulty of explaining how the District courts could ex-
ercise administrative functions consistently with the provisions of Article 3.
A minority of the judges argued that on this account the District courts must
be considered legislative. The majority replied that the status of those courts
was peculiar; that they were inferior federal courts within the words of the
Constitution; but that because of Congress's special powers over the District
of Columbia, there could be conferred upon its courts other functions than
those included within "the judicial power of the United States." In short,
the decision is that the courts of the District of Columbia are both constitu-
tional and legislative.
It remains to be considered whether there is any objection to such incon-
sistencies6 ' and any merit in attempting logically to rationalize them.52 The
legal theorist would, of course, answer in the affirmative. However, the re-
duction of judges' salaries, the performance by courts of administrative func-
tions, and the extent of the Supreme Court's appellate powers, are, in the last
analysis, questions involving entirely different considerations. There is no
practical reason why the solution of any one of them should control the deter-
mination of the others. Indeed, the very absence of a rigid, legal doctrine
clearly stating each problem in terms of the others is a virtue. For where
too much logic leads only to confusion of issues, it is better that the Court
be entirely free to decide each case upon its individual merits.
DETERMINATION OF LAW GOVERNING POWER OF RE-
DEMPTION IN CONDITIONAL SALES OF CHATTELS
IN the application of principles of conflicts of laws, American courts have given
but slight recognition to the fact that a contract right which is also an interest
in property may be subject to different sets of rules for deciding the law which
governs it, according as it is considered a contract right or a property right.
In cases involving contracts for the transfer of land courts have recognized
the applicability of either set of rules, and have decided, upon considerations
of expediency, which should prevail.1 But in dealing with contracts involv-
51. See Note (1933) 47 HAv. L. Rlv. 133, discussing the O'Donoghue and Williams cases.
52. See Note (1933) 22 GEo. L. J. 91.
1. Platner v. Vincent, 187 Cal. 443, 451, 202 Pac. 655, 658 (1921) (property rules pre-
ferred); Bethell v. BethelI, 54 Ind. 428 (1876) semble; see Cook, The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public
Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YA.E L. J. 736; Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sover-
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ing moveable chattels, the courts have either considered such rights as contract
rights without reference to the fact that they are also interests in chattels,
or have discussed them as property rights, ignoring their contractual aspects.
Often, this disregard of one set of rules or the other is of no consequence, since
adherence to one would lead to application of the same law as that required
by the other. However, where a particular court would apply the law of one
state to a contract and that of another state to property rights arising from
it, an interesting problem arises.
Such a problem appeared in the recent case of Thomas G. Jewett Jr., Inc.
v. Keystone Driller Co.2  An executory contract for the conditional sale of
a gasoline shovel was entered into in Massachusetts; in accordance therewith
the shovel was delivered to the vendee f. o. b. Manchester, New Hampshire.
The shovel had been stored in the latter state for nine months when, on de-
fault of payment by the vendee, it was repossessed by the vendor's agent.
Twenty-five days later the agent resold the shovel without having given to
the vendee notice required by the New Hampshire statutes. 3 Such notice
was not required by the redemption statute of Massachusetts, 4 the state in
which the contract had been made. In a suit for conversion by the vendee
against the vendor and his agent, a majority of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that the power of redemptions was a contract right,
the redemption statute of the state whose law governed the contract being
presumed to be a part of the contract of conditional sale.0 The court then
concluded that the law of Massachusetts, the lex loci contractus, governed
the parties' contract, and that notice to the original vendee was therefore not
a condition precedent to the vendor's privilege of resale. A dissenting opinion7
maintained that the power of redemption was a property right given by the
state in which the chattel was situated or in which the property interest in
the chattel had been transferred; and consequently that the law of New Hamp-
shire, requiring notice before resale by the vendor, was here applicable. Undc "
this view the resale was unprivileged.
The power of redemption is a contractual right, since it is available to
one party against another by virtue of a contract between them. At the same
time it is a property interest in the chattel, in that its exercise enables the
vendee to acquire the right both to possession and to title after default.8
eign States and the Conflict of Laws (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 368; cf. 1 WMARTON, CoN-
iscT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1905) §§ 273-287; GooDRicH, CoNrLIcT OF LAWS (1927) §§ 143-146.
2. 185 N. E. 369 (Mass. 1933), noted in (1933) 33 COL. L. Rxv. 1061, and (1933)
47 HARv. L. Rv. 128.
3. N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) c. 217, §§ 5-10.
4. MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 255, § 11.
5. The conditions precedent to the vendor's privilege to resell define the vendee's power
to redeem, the continued existence of which is the basis of the alleged conversion. Thus,
if the provisions for resale are different in two states there is not a different manner of
exercising the power of redemption, but a different power in each state.
6. The power of redemption, not expressly provided for in the contract of conditional
sale, must be considered as present there by virtue of the law of the state which governs
the rights and duties arising out of the contract. 2 WmLisToN, CONTRACrS (1920) § 615.
7. Lummus, J., supra note 2, at 372.
8. See Parker v. Dacres, 130 U. S. 43, 48 (1888); Package Confectionery Co. v. Perkit,
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But many courts, on the facts of the principal case, would have applied the
law of New Hampshire to the vendee's power of redemption whether that
power was regarded as a contract or as a property right. It is well estab-
lished that the law of the place where a chattel is situated at the time of an
inter vivos transfer governs the creation, extinction and transfer of property
interests in that chattel.9 Such a transfer is said to take place in a contract
of conditional sale when the parties intend the property interest in the chattel
to pass.'0 However, the frequent failure to make such an intention apparent
in sales contracts necessitates a resort to presumptions.1 The Uniform Sales
Act provides that if the chattel is "specific" and "in a deliverable state" when
the contract is made the interest is presumably intended to pass to the buyer
at once.12  But where the sale contract requires the seller to transport the
goods to a particular place, the property interest in the goods is presumed to
have been intended to pass only when the goods have reached that place.'3
In the principal case, there was no indication that the shovel was "specific"
and "deliverable" when the contract was made; but the "f. o. b. Manchester,
New Hampshire" provision gives rise to a presumption that the property in-
terest was intended to and therefore did pass in that state.' 4 Since the
transfer of the shovel was thus effected while the shovel was situated in New
Hampshire, property rights arising from the transfer would be governed by
the law of that state. The American Law Institute's Conflict of Laws Restate-
ment apparently takes a different approach in suggesting that the power of
redemption is a property right given by the state in which the chattel is situ-
ated when repossessed, without regard to the fact that the property interests
in the chattel may have been transferred in another state. 3 Under this view
184 N. E. 166, 167 (Mass. 1933); Us,'oas. CoNDmoNAL SALES ACT § 18; 2A BOGERT,
Unroaa. LAws ANN. (1924) §§ 112, 113, 115; VowD, LAw OF SALES (1931) 8 05, pp.
270-274, 280.
9. CoNmLCT or LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst., Proposed Final Draft, No. 2, 1931)
§§ 233, 278; 292, comment (b); 1 BEALE, CoNFLICT or LAWS (1916) § 153, p. 179;
GoonRicH, op. cit. supra note 1, § 147; WHARTON, CoNuucT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1881)
§§ 297, 304-309, 334, 345, 346; Falconbridge, Contract and Conveyance in the Conflict of
Laws (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. Rzv. 661, 673-675; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court
to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 Hatv. L. REV. 533,
536-537 (explaining the basic conflicts theories, "local laws" and "vested rights," for
governing the property rights by the lex situs).
10. See VOLD, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 50, 51.
11. Id. § 52.
12. UNn mone SALES AT § 19 (1); MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 106, § 21 (1); N. H.
PuB. LAws (1926) c. 166, § 19 (1); VOLD, op. cit. supra note 8, § 53. The property
interest in these circumstances would pass at the place where the chattel is then situated,
and the law of that place would govern.
13. UNoR= SALES AcT § 19 (5); MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 106, § 21 (5); N. H.
PUB. LAws (1926) c. 166, § 19 (5); Vow, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 78, 79.
14. Shipments "f.o.b. destination" come under the presumption that title passes at
the place of delivery, since the seller assumes the payment of freight. Harbison v. Propper,
112 Misc. 588, 595, 183 N. Y. Supp. 508, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Greer v. Oelhafen, 180
Wis. 131, 192 N. W. 467 (1923); VOLD, op. cit. supra note 8, § 79.
15. CoNFLicr OF LAWS RESTATEM:ENT, op. cit. sura note 9, § 302: "The right to fore-
close a chattel mortgage, lien or pledge and the right to redeem are governed by the law
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also the law of New Hampshire would define the power of redemption in the
principal case, since the shovel was stored in that state when repossessed by
the vendor. But if transfer of the property interests upon conditional sale
of a chattel were to take place in one state, which gave the vendee a power
of redemption, and the chattel were thereafter moved into another state, there
would be no justification for assuming that the state of subsequent situs would
substitute a new power of redemption merely because of the chattel's presence
there at the time of repossession, since no question of protecting third parties
is involved in such a case.' 6 The rule suggested by the Restatement apparently
must therefore be taken to mean that the power of redemption does not attach
at the time of the sale but rather only at the time of repossession, so that no
question of substituting one redemption right for another arises. But there
appears to be no foundation in the cases for thus dissociating the power of
redemption from the sale transaction; 17 nor is there any reason for thus dis-
tinguishing the property right of redemption from the other property interests
created by the sale transaction, since the vendee has a power of redemption
against the vendor solely because he bought the chattel from him. It would
seem, therefore, that in the principal case the law of New Hampshire would
govern the power of redemption viewed as a property right, but only for the
reason that the property interest in the shovel was transferred there.
Similarly, many courts in considering the power of redemption as a contract
right would apply the law of New Hampshire in the instant case. Determina-
tion of the law governing rights and duties arising out of a contract is gener-
ally said to be a matter of the parties' intention. But in the absence of any
indication of such intention courts often presume that had the parties con-
sidered the question they would have intended the law of the place of per-
formance to govern the rights and duties set up by the contract.'8 However,
the p6ssible complication in sales contracts of performances by the parties in
different states has led to the rule that with sales the law not of the place of
of the state in which the chattel is situated at the time of the foreclosure or redemption
proceedings."
16. In cases like Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307 (U. S. 1866), 7 Wall. 139 (U.
S. 1868); Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876); Universal
Credit Co. v. Marks, 163 Atl. 810 (Md. 1933); and United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. Northwest Engineering Co., 146 Miss. 476, 486, 112 So. 580, 582 (1927), it has
been held that state recording and lien statutes are intended to impose new property
obligations upon chattels brought into the state so that the rights of attaching creditors
of, and innocent purchasers from, the conditional vendee may be protected against the
reserved title of the conditional vendor. But except where the protection of third parties
is thus involved, there seems no basis for assuming that legislatures mean redemption
statutes to apply to contracts and conveyances made in another state. In a controversy
between the original parties to the sale, therefore, the law of the state of subsequent situs
would not be meant to govern the power of redemption.
17. Cf. White Co. v. Bragg, 168 Ark. 670, 273 S. W. 7 (1925); Gross v. Jordan, 83
Me. 380, 22 AUt. 250 (1891); Franklin Car Co. v. Hamilton, 113 Me. 63, 92 AtI. 1001
(1915); Package Confectionery Co. v. Perkit, supra note 8; Commercial Corp. Securities
Co. v. Nichols, 1 Western Weekly Reports 484 (Saskatchewan, 1933).
18. See Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (1921)
31 YArs L. J. 53 (a critical consideration of the doctrines used to decide the proper law
of contract).
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performance but of the place where the property interest in the goods passes
to the vendee, will be presumed to have been intended to govern. 9 By this
presumption these courts thus apply to the effects of a sales contract the same
law that is said to govern the creation of property rights arising out of the
sale. The courts adopting this reasoning would therefore hold that the law of
New Hampshire would also govern the power of redemption as a contract
right.
But the decision of the Massachusetts court that Massachusetts law gov-
erned the power of redemption as an effect of the contract despite the fact
that the property transfer may have taken place in New Hampshire, is not
without considerable support. Under another, perhaps less widely accepted,
doctrine as to the proper law of contract, the parties would be presumed to
have intended the law of the place of the making of the contract, lex loci
contractus, to govern the rights and duties created.2 0  This was apparently
the basis of the court's decision in the principal case. And a different law
would also govern the power of redemption as a property right than would
govern it as a contract right, where an intention is expressed to have the con-
tract governed by the law of a state other than that in which the transfer of
property interest is intended to take place.
Where, for either of these reasons, a different conclusion does follow from
the conflicts rules of property than from those of contracts, it would seem
logically necessary to apply the former if the court is to give full effect to
the familiar doctrine that the lex situs of a transfer must govern the property
rights arising therefrom; 21 for that doctrine would obviously include transfers
resulting from contracts. But neither logic nor policy requires a court to
apply this doctrine when to do so would result in denying the effect of a
contract which is governed by the law of the court's own state. In earlier
19. Ladd v. Dulany, 1 Cr. C. C. 583 (C. C. D. C. 1809); Fry Brothers v. Theobold,
205 Ky. 146, 149, 265 S. W. 498, 499 (1924); Shohfi v. Rice, 241 Mass. 211, 213, 135
N. E. 141, 142 (1922); Franklyn Sugar Refining Co. v. Lipowicz, 220 App. Div. 160, 221
N. Y. Supp. 11 (4th Dep't 1927), aff'd, 247 N. Y. 465, 160 N. E. 916 (1928); see 2 WHAIR-
TON, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 416, 417; 1 WMxLsrox, LAW OF SALEs (2d ed. 1924) § 339,
n. 58; Lorenzen, supra note 18, at 60-62.
20. See Lorenzen, supra note 18, at 58, 59, 61; BEAI., CAsEs ON CoNrucTs (1902)
Summary, § 90.
The American Law Institute Restatement treats together the validity of contracts
and the rights and duties arising out of them, stating that both are governed by the lex
loci contractus. Coniz~cr or LAWS RESTATEmENT, op. cit. supra note 9, § 353 (f), § 376A.
In view of the Reporter's position (Beale, What Law Governs th Validity of a Contract
(1909) 23 HAnv. L. REv. 260, 270) that this law should govern the validity of a contract
regardless of the parties' intentions, the inference is perhaps justified that the Restatement
is intended to advocate adoption of the same rule with regard to the contract rights and
duties. Under this view, of course, the Massachusetts law would necessarily govern- the
power of redemption in the principal case.
21. See GooDRicH, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 148, 150; Falconbridge, Contract and Con-
veyance in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 81 U. osF PA. L. Rxv. 817 ("the contractual effect
of the transaction is governed by the proper law of contract and the property effect by
the lex situs; and in case of conflict the former must yield to the latter").
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cases,22 the property law has always been preferred over contract law where
protection of the rights of third parties under subsequent transactions occur-
ring in the state of situs have been involved. But in a case such as the
principal one there is only a single transaction affecting the power of redemp-
tion and the rights of third parties are not involved. Therefore, unless the
state of property law has a much greater "connection '23 with the whole trans-
action than the state of contract law,24 the emphasis now placed upon thinking
in terms of contract, in contrast with the earlier emphasis on property rights,
suggests that the courts should prefer the contract law.25 On this basis, the
decision of the court in the principal case, that the law of Massachusetts, as
lex loci contractus, defined the power of redemption, seems well justified.
The problem of whether to apply contract law or property law to the power
of redemption cannot be avoided by calling that power a remedial right and
so governing it by the law of the forum.2 6  It has been suggested2 7 that since
redemption statutes refer to conditions precedent to resale they should be
said to relate to remedy.28 But by the usual tests for distinguishing between
remedial rights, or those having to do with procedure, and substantive rights,
the power of redemption dearly falls within the latter class.2 9  It is not a
22. See cases cited supra note 16; Eli Bridge Co. v. Lachman, 124 Ore. 592, 265 Pac.
435 (1928); Schmidt v. Perkins, 74 N. J. Law 785, 67 Atl. (1907); Cammel v. Sewell,
5 H. & N. 728, 157 Eng. Rep. 1371 (1866); MINOR, CoN:FLicT or LAWS (1901) § 129; cf.
Note (1933) 11 CAN. BAR REV. 352.
23. "Connection" has a peculiar significance in the literature of conflict of laws as
relating to the state in which those acts take place to which the parties' attention and
expectations are directed. Cf. Lorenzen, supra note 18, at 54, 57.
24. In a case where the state of proper law of contract has no more "connection"
with the transaction than the accidental signing of the contract within its limits, while
the state of conveyance has a much closer "connection," it would seem to be an exercise
of common sense to recognize and prefer the lex situs.
25. And this seems to be the tendency of the courts, which talk of the power of
redemption as a contract right. See Gross v. Jordan; Franklin Car Co. v. Hamilton;
Commercial Corp. Securities Co. v. Nichols, all supra note 17; also cf. Cable Co. v. Mc-
Elhoe, 58 Ind. App. 637, 108 N. E. 790 (1915) (law of contract held to govern the passage
of title despite transfer of title in another state, the court recognizing the problem of
the possible application of either the law of contract or lex situs to the same transaction) ;
MINOR, loc. cit. supra note 22; 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 311 (c), 317 (b), 355
(b); Lorimer, The Relation of the Lex Loci Contractus to the Lex Loci Rei Sitae (1911)
22 JuR. REv. 275 (extension by the English courts of the scope of lex loci contractus at
the expense of lex situs).
26. Nor can the lex fori be held applicable in the instant case on the grounds of
public policy, for it is extremely unlikely that an otherwise applicable power of redemp-
tion different from that of Massachusetts only in the addition of a notice requirement
could be considered so repugnant to the public policy of that commonwealth that its
court would refuse to adopt and so give effect thereto. See Note (1933) 33 COL. L.
REv. 508.
27. (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rav. 1061.
28. Public Parks Amusement Co. v. Embree McLean Carriage Co., 64 Ark. 29, 40
S. W. 582 (1897), followed in Wurzel v. Delphis' Sons, 33 Ohio C. C. 219 (1912).
Contra: White Co. v. Bragg, supra note 17.
29. None of the courts in Gross v. Jordan; Franklin Car Co. v. Hamilton; Commercial
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right to secure enforcement of a claim for reparation against the vendor for
wrongful violation of one of the vendee's primary rights,30 but is itself a
primary substantive right. Even assuming the vendor's privilege of resale
to be a matter of remedy, the conditions precedent to that privilege are defin-
itive of the vendee's power of redemption and so create primary substantive
relations between the parties to the sale.3 ' This is made evident by the fact
that substitution of the power of redemption given by the forum for that
given by the law governing the contract or property interest might increase
or decrease the obligation of the contract or the property transfer.32 Indeed,
whenever the definition of a right by the law of the forum rather than by
the law of the state creating the primary rights would make a difference in
the result of the suit, that right might well be considered to be substantive.33
Corp. Securities Co. v. Nichols, all supra note 17, or in the instant case, have even sug-
gested that the power of redemption could be called a remedial right.
30. See 1 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 140, 164; GOODICH, op. cit. supra note 1,
§ 81.
31. In the land mortgage cases of Hughes v. Winkleman, 243 Mo. 81, 147 S. W. 994
(1912), and Wilson v. Kryger, 29 N. D. 28, 149 N. W. 721 (1914), the courts, proceeding
upon the dubious assumption that the power of redemption was a secondary right, in-
ferred that the power was therefore a procedural matter, connected with the enforce-
ment of contract rights. But the fallacy of this inference has been demonstrated. Note
(1915) 25 YALE L. J. 147, 148; Note (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 405, 408.
32. See Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 241, 111 N. E. 837, 839 (1910); Minor,
Conflict of Laws-Substance or Obligation of Contract Distinguished from Remedy (1902)
16 HARV. L. REV. 262, 263.
33. See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YALE L.
J. 333, 342, 344 et seq.
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